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JUSTIFYING POWER:
FEDERALISM, IMMIGRATION, AND
‘FOREIGN AFFAIRS’
ERIN F. DELANEY

*

INTRODUCTION
Immigration federalism is all the rage. In countries such as the
1
United States, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and Spain, academics
and politicians are engaged in heated debates over the best ways to
create and implement immigration and integration policies across the
2
many levels of a federal system. But these policy debates are
constructed and constrained by the background constitutional rules
that allocate powers in a given federation. In the United States, in
particular, the allocation to the federal government of power over
immigration has dramatic implications for how states may, or may not,

* Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. For their generous assistance
and suggestions, I am grateful to Joseph Blocher, Catherine Kim, Travis Lenkner, Ralf
Michaels, Hiroshi Motomura, Tanusri Prasanna, Dana Remus, Kristen Stilt, Ernest Young, the
participants at the Perspectives on Migration, Governance, and Citizenship Symposium, and the
Zodiac Group at Northwestern Law School. Linda Nyberg provided excellent research
assistance. To the editors and staff of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law amd Public
Policy, thank you very much for organizing the symposium and inviting me to participate.
1. See, e.g., Joanna Drozdz, Spanish Leadership in Developing a ‘Common’ European
Immigration Policy: Intergovernmentalist Supranationalization Approach (2011) (unpublished
Masters thesis, DePaul University), http://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/92. See generally Graeme
Boushey & Adam Luedtke, Fiscal Federalism and the Politics of Immigration: Centralized and
Decentralized Immigration Policies in Canada and the United States, 8 J. COMP. POL’Y
ANALYSIS 207 (2006); Dagmar Soennecken, Germany and the Janus Face of Immigration
Federalism: Devolution vs. Centralization, in IMMIGRATION REGULATION IN FEDERAL STATES:
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Sasha Baglay & Delphine
Nakache eds., forthcoming).
2. Integration policies—which are not explored in this Article—refer to the processes by
which immigrants are incorporated into society, particularly into labor markets. Immigration
policy, on the other hand, focuses on questions of entry and exit. See generally MARTIN A.
SCHAIN, THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION IN FRANCE, BRITAIN, AND THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (2008); Noah Lewin-Epstein et al., Institutional Structure and Immigrant
Integration: A Comparative Study of Immigrants’ Labor Market Attainment in Canada and
Israel, 37 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 389 (2003); Anja Wiesbrock, The Integration of Immigrants in
Sweden: a Model for the European Union?, 49 INT’L MIGRATION 48 (2011).
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take part in the politics of immigration. There is, therefore, a
particular importance to identifying and understanding the
constitutional contexts in which these debates occur—the structural
foundations of immigration federalism.
In most Western federations, particularly those considered
countries of immigration, the ex ante constitutional allocations of
power are set (though, as in the United States, there is certainly
contestation at the margins). In the quasi-federal European Union,
however, the current debate is over first principles: Which level of
government—the Member States or the supranational EU
institutions—should have the power to regulate immigration, and
under what rationale? These questions take on a certain immediacy
due to provisions in the newly ratified Lisbon Treaty that purport to
structure European immigration federalism. Under Lisbon, individual
Member States and the supranational European Union now share
power over immigration regulation, conditioned on a requirement
that the supranational-level institutions provide reasons justifying
their efforts to regulate. But what will be considered an acceptable
justification to preempt or condition Member State action? The
answer will set the constitutional contours of the EU federalism
dynamic in immigration, perhaps with implications far into the future.
To inform the EU debate, this Article looks to the United States
to provide some comparative insights on first-order federalism issues.
Although little work has been done in the specific context of
immigration federalism, comparisons between the European Union
and the United States are widely accepted, as the European Union is
understood by many to display elements of a federal system sufficient
4
to allow for useful and meaningful comparative analysis. As a
threshold matter, any comparison must identify the correct historical

3. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497, 2510 (2012) (invalidating parts of
Arizona law S.B. 1070 designed to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of
aliens” as preempted by federal law); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973
(2011) (finding no federal preemption of Arizona law imposing sanctions on businesses
employing undocumented immigrants).
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL BURGESS, FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN UNION: THE BUILDING
OF EUROPE, 1950-2000 (2000); LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL
SOVEREIGNTY: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (2001); INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (Mauro Cappelletti et
al. eds., 1986); THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Kalypos Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).
See generally Dividing and Sharing Power: Lessons for the European Union, 15 REGIONAL &
FED. STUD. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2005).
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period in the United States in which to situate the analysis. In this
case, it was during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
when the power over immigration was finally (and firmly) allocated
6
to the federal government. The result—a plenary federal power over
immigration—and the subsequent historical experience of the United
States suggest something of a cautionary tale to European Member
States wary of losing national control over immigration issues. Given
the differences between the two systems, the European Union is
unlikely to conform to the American experience in every respect;
nevertheless, lessons from the United States should encourage
Member States to interrogate closely the rationales provided by
supranational institutions to justify their actions.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I opens with a brief
history outlining the evolution of power over immigration in the
European Union, from a jealously guarded competence exclusive to
the Member States to one shared by the Member States and the
supranational institutions. It then lays out the legal framework
provided by the Lisbon Treaty, reviews a recent legislative proposal
made at the supranational level seeking to regulate seasonal workers
(the “Seasonal Workers Directive”), and analyzes the associated set of
arguments for supranational action, including a “foreign policy”
justification. In assessing the claims for and against supranational
power in this particular European context, certain rationales emerge
that once were used in American debates.
Part II begins by demonstrating the relevance of the American
experience to that of Europe. In the United States, as in Europe under
the Lisbon Treaty, the locus of immigration power was not clearly
defined by the Constitution, and broad action by the federal
government still required justification as late as the 1880s. The U.S.
Supreme Court ultimately filled this reason-giving role, and Part II
analyzes the arguments the Court developed, particularly the “foreign
affairs” rationale for plenary federal power. Part II concludes by

5. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4 (antebellum United States); Erin Delaney,
Managing in a Federal System Without an ‘Ultimate Arbiter’: Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the EU
and the Ante-bellum United States, 15 REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 225 (2005); Erin Delaney &
Luca Barani, The Promotion of ‘Symmetrical’ European Citizenship: A Federal Perspective, 25 J.
EUR. INTEGRATION 95 (2003) (United States in the 1790s); Robert A. Garson, The Euro? So
What's New? Federalism, Nationalism and the Adoption of the United States Dollar, 1776-1792,
in FEDERALISM, CITIZENSHIP AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES IN U.S. HISTORY 9 (Cornelis A.
van Minnen & Sylvia L. Hilton eds., 2000).
6. See infra Part II.B.
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identifying the downstream effects of this rationale in Supreme Court
doctrine and its broader implications for the relationship between the
states and the federal government in the United States.
Building on the American experience, Part III returns to the
European Union and draws a parallel between the “foreign policy”
justification and the “foreign affairs” rationale. Reviewing the force of
the foreign affairs rationale in the U.S. context, this Part contends that
the American experience should concern those Member States
reluctant to cede power to the European Union. Although power
over immigration may be shared, the boundaries of action are
uncertain, and some Member States might prefer to maintain more
control at the state level, either as a matter of immigration policy or
7
as a matter of principle. Comparative evidence from the American
experience suggests these Member States should be particularly
attentive to the use of the foreign policy justification by the
supranational institutions. Part III concludes by suggesting a
procedural mechanism to limit the reach of an all-encompassing
European foreign policy, or “foreign affairs,” rationale.
I. CONTESTED POWER: IMMIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
From its earliest incarnation as the European Coal and Steel
Community, the European integration project has pooled sovereignty
8
among European countries in order to achieve shared goals. What
began as a narrow agreement among six countries to create a
common market in coal and steel has led to a Union of twenty-eight
nations with an expansive common internal market, open internal
9
10
borders, and a shared currency. The powerful logic of integration in
a single European market has resulted in many areas of supranational
power, and the willingness of Member States to limit their sovereignty
7. See infra Part I.B (discussing the problem of “creeping competence”).
8. Speaking before the Bundestag on July 12, 1951, Konrad Adenauer described the
European Coal and Steel Community as “the first time in history [that] nations were voluntarily
giving up ‘a portion of their sovereignty’ to a supranational institution—‘an event which
signifies the end of nationalism . . . which has been the cancer of Europe.’” HENRY L. MASON,
THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY: EXPERIMENT IN SUPRANATIONALISM 13
(1955) (citation omitted).
9. Twenty-two Member States of the European Union are members of the border-free
Schengen Zone. See Member Countries of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ (last visited May 28, 2013). On the
Schengen Zone, see infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
10. The Euro is shared among seventeen Member States. See Member Countries of the
European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/
(last visited May 28, 2013).
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and act in concert has been remarkable. Nevertheless, and
notwithstanding the many areas of power already delegated to
“Europe,” the debate over the allocation of powers between the
supranational EU institutions and the Member States is a perennial
issue in European political life. Immigration, or “migration,” as it is
referred to in Europe, has long been in the crosshairs of these larger
structural debates.
Migration operates against the background principle of the free
movement of persons, one of the four fundamental freedoms at the
12
core of the European integration project. The initial understanding
of this freedom and its reach was tightly connected to the
development of the common market: There was to be free movement
13
of workers who also were nationals of the Member States. The free
movement principle eventually expanded to include all citizens of EU
Member States, providing them the right to live and work in any EU
14
Member State. Member States are severely limited in their ability to
15
burden this intra-EU movement, but they are not similarly
constrained in relation to third-country nationals (TCNs), who do not
16
have free movement rights under European law.
11. Much effort has been spent explicating the dynamics behind European integration, and
there are a number of competing theories. Classic works on the subject include: ALAN S.
MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF THE NATION-STATE (1992) (intergovernmentalism);
ANDY MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE POWER FROM
MESSINA TO MASSTRICHT (1998) (intergovernmentalism); ERNST HAAS, THE UNITING OF
EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES 1950-1957 (1958) (functionalism); and
Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal
Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993) (neofunctionalism).
12. The other freedoms are the free movement of goods, services, and capital. Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 3(a), (c), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
15 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], available at http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution
/library/historic%20documents/Rome/TRAITES_1957_CEE.pdf.
13. Michelle Everson, The Legacy of the Market Citizen, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF
EUROPEAN UNION 73 (Jo Shaw & Gillian More eds., 1996).
14. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
20(2)(a), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 56 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:0047:0200:EN:PDF.
15. This statement has some qualifications: During negotiations over enlargement, certain
Member States, fearful of an influx of new workers from Eastern Europe, sought limitations on
free movement for these new EU citizens. See, e.g., EU-25: Member States Grapple with the Free
Labour Market, EURACTIV (May 5, 2004), http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/eu-25member-states-grapple-free-labour-market/article-117775.
16. The concept of TCNs does not include the stateless, including Europe’s Roma people.
A discussion of the role of the stateless in immigration federalism is beyond the scope of this
Article. For more information on this aspect of the immigration debate, see generally Claude
Cahn & Peter Vermeersch, The Group Expulsion of Slovak Roma by the Beglian Government:
A Case Study of the Treatment of Romani Refugees in Western Countries, 13 CAMBRIDGE REV.
INT’L AFF. 71 (2000). On statelessness and human rights, see generally David Weissbrodt &
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Third-country migration implicates many areas of traditional
Member State interest—membership and citizenship, language,
culture, and a nation’s internal labor market—and these concerns
have largely trumped any competing pressures for Union-wide action.
For much of the EU’s history, regulating migration from third17
countries was considered a purely national prerogative. It was not
until the late 1990s that the EU’s supranational institutions were
given power to engage in migration control; since then, supranational
legislation has primarily engaged with asylum issues and irregular
migration, only very recently shifting to work-related migration and
the labor market, the focus of this Article.
This Part opens with a brief review of the historical development
toward shared power in migration matters, implemented by the
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. It then turns to the details of the Lisbon Treaty
itself: Lisbon provides a legal basis for supranational action on
migration and requires the European institutions to justify such
action under the principle of subsidiarity, by explaining why the
relevant issue cannot be resolved appropriately at the Member State
level. Finally, this Part looks in detail at a recently proposed piece of
legislation regulating the conditions of entry and residence of TCNs
for the purposes of seasonal employment—the Seasonal Workers
Directive. Promulgated under the new Lisbon rules, this proposed
Directive provided the first opportunity for the European institutions
and the Member States to debate the supranational role in regulating
labor-related immigration in the context of shared power.
A. The Road to Lisbon: A Brief Historical Note
Shared power over third-country migration would have been
unthinkable thirty years ago. In fact, “most member-states believed
that they were completely free regarding immigration law vis-à-vis
18
non-[European Community] nationals,” and they preferred to
maintain control at the nation-state level. From a competence
exclusive to the Member States to one shared between the Member
States and the supranational institutions, the regulation of migration
is an example of both the powerful logic of integration and the
continued importance to the Member States of national culture and
Clay Collins, The Human Rights of Stateless Persons, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 245 (2006).
17. ANDREW GEDDES, THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE 131
(2003).
18. GALLYA LAHAV, IMMIGRATION AND POLITICS IN THE NEW EUROPE 40 (2004).

DELANEY 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

10/21/2013 7:27 PM

JUSTIFYING POWER

159

national power.
For many years, Member States not only refused to delegate
sovereignty to European institutions over third-country migration
issues but also aggressively guarded Member State power through
litigation. In 1985, when the European Commission (the Commission)
proposed an information-sharing procedure related to migration
19
policies, five of the then ten Member States took the institution to
20
court. The Member States argued that the Commission lacked
competence to adopt the measure, as migration was a field within the
“exclusive jurisdiction” of the Member States. The French Republic
made the additional argument that “matters relating to the conditions
of entry, residence and employment of nationals of non-member
21
countries affect[ed] the Member States’ security,” another area of
critical national interest.
The Commission had proposed similar information-sharing
“communication and consultation” procedures in other substantive
areas, yet the Member States neither “raised [their] voices [nor their]
22
eyebrows” in response. But as Advocate General Mancini noted in
his opinion in support of the Commission, “the Member States are . . .
vitally . . . interested in preserving full control over the admission to
their territory of workers from non-member countries, inter alia
23
because of its obvious political and public-policy ramifications.” The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) produced a delicately constructed
opinion, invalidating much of the procedure while saving some of the
24
25
consultation mechanisms. But no consultations ever occurred.
Contemporaneous to this litigation, the Member States were
negotiating an expansive new treaty arrangement under the Single
European Act (SEA). The SEA promised the completion of the
common market, describing it as “an area without internal frontiers in

19. The European Commission is the supranational body responsible for proposing
European legislation. See infra note 35 for a discussion of the legislative process in the
European Union.
20. Joined Cases 281, 283–85, & 287/85, Germany v. Comm’n, 1987 E.C.R. 3203. In
addition to Germany, the suing states included the Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom,
and Denmark.
21. Id. ¶ 9. Article 118 of the EEC Treaty gave the Commission “the task of promoting
closer cooperation between Member States in the social field.” EEC Treaty, supra note 12, art.
118, at 96.
22. Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, Germany v. Comm’n, 1987 E.C.R. 3219, 3223.
23. Id. at 3229.
24. Germany v. Comm’n, 1987 E.C.R. 3203, 3252–53, ¶¶ 23, 27.
25. GEDDES, supra note 17, at 131.
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which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is
26
ensured.” The Member States were careful in negotiations to
27
maintain exclusive power over immigration, but the logic of the
internal market and freedom of movement would eventually
“stimulate[] a tendency towards greater cooperation and
28
coordination” in the field.
Rather than using the European Union (then Community)
institutions to pass legislation, Member States chose to work together
in transnational groupings, often completely outside the Union
framework. Negotiating among themselves, Member States created
29
the Schengen Agreement on removing internal borders and adopted
30
the Dublin Convention on streamlining asylum claims. The creation
of the Schengen Area (or Zone) in 1985 facilitated the free movement
of those already permitted to live and work in the signatory states and
changed the nature of travel in much of Europe. Note, however, that
the existence of open internal borders between certain EU Member
States did not in itself provide any general right to free movement;
TCNs continue to be admitted to a single Member State and may not
transfer that admission right to gain entry to another Member State.
That TCNs must seek admission seriatim has particular salience in the
context of asylum—a fact that led some Member States to negotiate
31
the Dublin Convention (ratified in 1990). Member States were
concerned about perceived forum-shopping by asylees seeking the
most advantageous welfare benefits, frustrated by the possibility that
an applicant, after being denied by one Member State, could keep
reapplying for asylum in other Member States, and solicitous of those
countries facing increased migration due to their location on the

26. Single European Act art. 13, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 7 [hereinafter SEA]
(amending the EEC Treaty), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/
documents/treaties/singleuropeanact.pdf.
27. See id. arts. 13, 19, at 9, 12; Single European Act, Political Declaration by the
Governments of the Member-States on the Free Movement of Persons, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J.
(L 169) 1, 26; see also Opinion of Advocate General Mancini, Germany v. Comm’n, 1987 E.C.R.
3219, 3229 (discussing Member State actions in negotiations over the SEA).
28. GRETE BROCHMANN, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND IMMIGRATION FROM THIRD
COUNTRIES 77 (1996).
29. Schengen Acquis, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:239:0001:0473:EN:PDF.
30. Council Regulation 343/2003, on Asylum Applications by Third-Country Nationals,
2003 O.J. (L 50) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2003:050:0001:0010:EN:PDF; see also LAHAV, supra note 18, at 44.
31. See generally Agnès Hurwitz, The 1990 Dublin Convention: A Comprehensive
Assessment, 11 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 646 (1999).
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borders of the Union. Created outside the EU framework, the
Schengen Area and the Dublin Convention were not initially part of
the European acquis, thus Member States were not required to join
32
and some Member States chose to opt-out.
By the early 1990s, Member States recognized the need for a more
comprehensive approach, committing themselves through the
Maastricht Treaty to collective action in asylum and migration
33
matters. But again, cooperation was to come through strictly
34
intergovernmental, rather than communitarian, means. Maastricht,
or the Treaty on European Union, created an unusual system that
divided subject matters into three groupings, or pillars. The internal
market was placed in the First Pillar and was subject to what has
become known as the “Community method” of lawmaking. This
method makes use of the communitarian institutions: The
Commission proposes a law, which is then debated, amended, and
voted on by both the Council of Ministers (Council) and the
35
European Parliament. Voting in the Council is by qualified majority

32. In general, European Union law is valid in all Member States without reservation.
However, a handful of Member States have negotiated “opt-outs” that entitle them to choose
not to participate in certain policy areas, such as the Schengen Area or the eurozone. Ireland
and the United Kingdom are the only Member States that have opted-out from Schengen, and
not without controversy. Julian J.E. Schutte, UK v. EU: A Continuous Test Match, 34
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1346, 1355 (2011); see also Daniel Mason, Schengen Opt-Out Damaging
UK Economy, PUBLIC SERVICE EUROPE (July 29, 2011), http://www.publicserviceeurope.com
/article/680/schengen-opt-out-damaging-uk-economy. For a general discussion of this system of
opt-outs—referred to as a “multispeed” or “two-speed” European Union—see generally JEANCLAUDE PIRIS, THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: TOWARDS A TWO-SPEED EU? (2012).
33. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 [hereinafter Maastricht
TEU], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1992:224:0001:
0130:EN:PDF.
34. All institutions of the European Union are considered supranational; they lie on a
spectrum between communitarian and intergovernmental. The key institutions considered
communitarian are the Commission, the European Parliament, and the ECJ, all thought to have
strong commitments to continuing the European integration project and to European Union
norms, separate and distinct from the interests, or aggregated interests, of the Member States.
In contrast, the Council of Ministers, in which Member States have equal representation,
functions as an intergovernmental institution, particularly when operating under unanimity
rules. For a description of the law-making process, see infra note 35. The European Council is a
distinct body of Member State heads of government that sets the EU’s political agenda but has
no power to pass legislation.
35. This method, formerly known as the “co-decision procedure,” was renamed the
“ordinary legislative procedure” by the Lisbon Treaty. The lawmaking procedure vests equal
authority in the Council and the Parliament and is the main method by which EU laws are
promulgated. First, the Commission drafts the text of a proposed piece of legislation, which the
Parliament reviews and suggests changes to in a so-called “first reading.” After the Commission
considers the Parliament’s suggestions and revises the text, the Council makes its own first
reading and adopts a common position on the text. The common position is then sent to the

DELANEY 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

162

10/21/2013 7:27 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 8:1

voting (QMV), rather than unanimity, so no one Member State can
serve as a veto point. Furthermore, the ECJ is given jurisdiction to
interpret the law. In contrast, the Second and Third Pillars were
designed to be intergovernmental. In intergovernmental issues, the
Member States, represented in the Council and acting under the
principle of unanimity, make collective decisions about possible action
without formal input from the Commission or Parliament, and
without threat of judicial review. The Maastricht Treaty placed Justice
and Home Affairs, which included asylum and immigration, in the
intergovernmental Third Pillar. Thus, border crossing by TCNs
remained “one of the last strongholds of [Member State]
36
sovereignty.”
In the late 1990s, the Amsterdam Treaty cracked the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Member States over immigration by authorizing a
major shift: Five years after ratification, asylum and immigration
issues would move from the intergovernmental Third Pillar to the
communitarian First Pillar of the Union system. At that time, the
Commission would have competence to introduce legislation on some
37
migration issues, subject to a unanimity requirement in the Council.
Notwithstanding this apparent shift, the Member States also created,
through the Council, an intergovernmental working group on asylum
and migration issues designed to complement (at best) or undermine
38
(at worst) the Commission’s nascent role.
Parliament along with a statement of reasons. Parliament then conducts its second reading
within three months of receiving the Council’s common position, at which point it can accept it,
reject it, or propose amendments. If the Parliament approves the text or simply takes no action
at all, the Council must adopt that version of the law. If the Parliament rejects the text, the act is
vetoed; if it amends the text, the Council can agree to the changes (and thus adopt the act) or
reject them. If the Council rejects the changes, the proposed legislation is brought before a
Conciliation Committee, composed of an equal number of representatives from the Council and
the Parliament, which has six weeks to approve a joint text before the act is deemed dead. If the
Committee does manage to come to an agreement, the text of the law is sent to the Parliament
and the Council for their respective third reading. Both institutions must approve the text within
six weeks, at which point it finally becomes law. If either institution fails to do so, the act lapses.
TFEU, supra note 14, art. 294, at 173–75.
36. Emek M. Uçarer, Guarding the Borders of the European Union: Paths, Portals, and
Prerogatives, in MIGRATION AND THE EXTERNALITIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 15, 28
(Sandra Lavenex & Emek M. Uçarer eds., 2002).
37. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts arts. 63–64, Oct. 2, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 29–30 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam], available at http://www.lexnet.dk
/law/download/treaties/Ams-1997.pdf.
38. The High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration was designed to take action
in those areas scheduled to be transferred to the First Pillar. See Joanne van Selm, Immigration
and Asylum or Foreign Policy: The EU’s Approach to Migrants and their Countries of Origin, in
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The Janus-like nature of the Member States’ approach to
migration issues continued into the new millennium. At the Tampere
European Council in 1999, in a statement that would have been
inconceivable fifteen years earlier, Member States agreed that the
Union needed to develop “common policies on asylum and
39
immigration,” including partnerships with countries of origin, a
common European asylum system, fair treatment of TCNs, and
40
management of migration flows. Once again, however, the rhetoric
did not match Member State action. In negotiations over the Treaty of
Nice in 2001, Member States decided to modify the Amsterdam
approach: Any permanent move to QMV on issues of migration and
41
asylum would be contingent on a unanimous vote in the Council.
The reluctance of the Member States to allow for communitarian
lawmaking power over regular migration was instantiated in the
debates over this requirement of unanimity. The challenges presented
by unanimity are well known—the threat of holdouts “makes the
probability of cooperation fall with the number of actors who must
42
cooperate.” And there was a general recognition by 2002 that the
constraints of unanimity had limited “progress even in realizing the
short term objectives set in Tampere,” and that there was little chance
“the ambitious long-term vision agreed to in Tampere could be
achieved by unanimity voting among [what would soon be twenty43
five] Member States.” Within this modified Amsterdam approach, it
has taken “years of negotiations” to achieve directives on family
44
reunification, asylum, and the status of long-term resident TCNs.

MIGRATION AND THE EXTERNALITIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 143, 151 (Sandra Lavenex
& Emek M. Uçarer eds., 2002) (“A cross-pillar body made up of member state officials, dealing
with the foreign policy aspects of asylum and migration would clearly not take on First Pillar
characteristics.”).
39. Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, (Oct. 15-16, 1999) ¶ 3
[hereinafter Presidency Conclusions].
40. See generally Presidency Conclusions, supra note 39.
41. LAHAV, supra note 18, at 47.
42. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 140 (2010); see also id. at 139–42 (explaining why
unanimity rule paralyzes organizations and majority rule can serve to “increase[] the optimal
number of governments in a federal system”).
43. European Convention Working Group X, Final Report of Working Group X,
‘Freedom, Security and Justice,’ at 4, CONV 426/02 (Dec. 2, 2002).
44. Simon Green, Divergent Traditions, Converging Responses: Immigration and
Integration Policy in the UK and Germany, 16 GER. POL. 95, 103 (2007). On family reunification
rights for TCNs, see generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Rationing Family Values in Europe and
America: An Immigration Tug of War between States and their Supra-National Associations, 25
GEO. IMM. L.J. 807 (2011).
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Only recently has any effort been made at the supranational level to
45
regulate legal work-related migration.
The ongoing tension between the communitarization of
immigration and asylum policy and the desire of some Member States
to maintain national control has resulted in “immigration
46
harmonization lag[ging] behind other EU policy areas.” But in
October 2008, under the leadership of the French Presidency of the
European Union, the Member States agreed to a European Pact on
Immigration and Asylum (EPIA). In the EPIA, they recognized the
need for collective action, as “decisions taken by a Member State will
47
have repercussions for all other Member States.” Of course, such
collective action could have continued through primarily
intergovernmental negotiation, but in 2009, the Lisbon Treaty finally
gave the communitarian institutions a role.
B. Lisbon and Subsidiarity
In contrast to migration issues, in which Member States were able
to maintain their control, in other areas of regulation the Europeanlevel institutions seemed to accrue increasing power even in the
48
absence of specific grants from the Member States. The Lisbon
45. See Council Directive 2009/50, 2009 O.J. (L 155) 17 (EC) (discussing the Commission
proposals on highly qualified workers (EU Blue Card), which were presented in 2007 and
approved in 2009). But see Petra Bendel, Everything Under Control? The European Union’s
Policies and Politics of Immigration, in THE EUROPEANIZATION OF NATIONAL POLICIES AND
POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION 32, 34 (Thomas Faist & Andreas Ette eds., 2007) (“[I]n legal
migration . . . some member states have insisted on preserving their domestic competencies and
have refused to transmit them towards supranational authorities. In particular Germany and its
Länder have been the most rigid defenders of maintaining domestic discretion with respect to
labour migration issues . . . .”).
46. Terri Givens & Adam Luedtke, The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy:
Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization, 32 POL’Y STUD. J. 145, 146 (2004); see also Adam
Luedtke et al., Introduction: Regulating the New Face of Europe, in MIGRANTS AND
MINORITIES: THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE 1, 6 (Adam Luedtke ed., 2010) (“Another key
difference between immigration policy and most other areas of EU policy was that until 2004
the European Commission did not have the sole right of initiative to propose a policy . . . [thus]
until 2005 harmonisation proceeded in a more bottom-up manner, in line with national
interests.”).
47. THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY, THE EUROPEAN PACT ON IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
(2008), available at http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/content/download/34482/258636/
file/19_Plaquette_EN.edf.
48. See Mark Pollack, Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European
Community, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y 95, 98 (1994); Mark Pollack, The End of Creeping Competence?
E.U. Policy-Making Since Maastricht, 38 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 519, 527 (2000); see also
Philippe Schmitter, Imagining the Future of Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts, in
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 121, 124 (Gary Marks et al. eds., 1996) (“[T]here is
no issue area that was the exclusive domain of national policy in 1950 that has not somehow and
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Treaty was designed in part to address a growing fear among Member
States of “creeping competence”—a phenomenon in which
supranational institutions claim power over an increasing number of
policy areas due to ongoing and possibly self-perpetuating “task
49
expansion.” To provide more Member State control, Lisbon
established a general rule of enumerated, or conferred powers, at the
50
European level. Through a delineation of competences, it sought to
make clear which powers were conferred on the Union and which
were retained by the Member States. But not all powers could be
neatly divided, and some, such as the power over immigration, are
now shared.
In detailing the shared power over third-country migration, the
51
Lisbon Treaty contains an “eye-catching paradox.” Articles 67(2) and
79(2) provide clear grants of power to the EU to “frame a common
policy on asylum, immigration and external border control,” including
52
“conditions of entry and residence” for immigrants. These articles
demonstrate an embrace of the Community method, complete with
Commission-driven initiative, co-decision with Parliament, QMV in
to some degree been incorporated within the authoritative purview of the EC/EU.”).
49. See Pollack, supra note 48, at 98. The Lisbon Treaty emerged out of the wreckage of
the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, a document created after an extensive
constitutional convention and series of intergovernmental conferences. See Draft Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1 (never ratified). The draft
constitution failed to be ratified by the Member States, and the Lisbon Treaty was a later effort
to update the institutions of the European Union in light of the EU’s eastward expansion. The
need for a draft constitution was in large part justified by the concerns about creeping
competence and desire for clearly demarcated powers. See Angelika Hable, Reflections on the
Reform of Competences in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 15 REGIONAL &
FED. STUD. 145, 145 (2005); see also Ingeborg Tömmel, The European Union—A Federation Sui
Generis?, in THE EU AND FEDERALISM 41, 48 (Finn Laursen ed., 2011) (“[W]ith more and
more political tasks moving to the European level—either by deliberate transfer or as a matter
of fact—governmental actors increasingly perceived the need for a clear distribution of
competences between the levels.”).
50. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union arts. 1, 4–5, Feb. 7, 1992,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 18 [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF (“By this Treaty,
the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union . . . on which the
Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common . . . . Competences
not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.”); accord Armin
von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast, The Federal Order of Competences, in PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 275 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2d ed.
2009).
51. Sara Iglesias Sánchez, European Immigration and the Path Towards Federalism: A
New Model for the New EU as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?, in EUROPEAN
MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES: COHERENCE OR CONTRADICTION? 227, 232 (Cristina
Gortázar et al. eds., 2012).
52. TFEU, supra note 14, arts. 67(2), 79(2), at 73, 77.
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the Council, and jurisdiction in the ECJ. Yet according to Article
79(5), the Member States are to retain power to determine the
volume of admitted TCNs and, concomitantly, control over their
53
national labor markets. Given the unwieldy manner in which power
is divided over migration issues, and the lack of an overarching
54
purpose behind the competence, determining how to allocate this
shared competence is difficult.
The Lisbon Treaty provided a theory and a process for making this
allocation, through a renewed focus on subsidiarity. Subsidiarity, a
concept rooted in Catholic theory, is tied to the republican ideal of
self-government, where actions are taken at the level closest to the
55
people affected. In addition, the doctrine is often thought “to
promote higher efficiency and transparency of political decisions and
respond to demands for accommodation of historically developed
56
traditions.” But the concept is most often explained in terms similar
to those describing collective action federalism in the United States:
Subsidiarity limits supranational action to those issues that cannot be
57
resolved appropriately at the Member State level.
Subsidiary was first introduced as a general principle of EU law in
58
the Maastricht Treaty. In both Maastricht and later in the Lisbon
Treaty, attention to subsidiarity was driven by a desire to protect a
“clearly defined and legally enforceable area of autonomy” for the
59
Member States. The Lisbon Treaty rearticulated the key test, which
states: “[T]he Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
53. Id. art. 79(5), at 78.
54. See Anna Kocharov, Subsidiarity After Lisbon: Federalism Without a Purpose?, in
DECONSTRUCTING EU FEDERALISM THROUGH COMPETENCES 7, 12 (Loïc Azoulai et al. eds.,
2011), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2012/10631.pdf (“[T]he divide between
Union and Member State competences is not set in the Treaties directly (by [an] express limit
on competences) nor indirectly (by directing the exercise of powers towards any specific
finalité).”).
55. See George Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339–40 (1994).
56. Christoph Ritzer et al., How to Sharpen a Dull Sword—The Principle of Subsidiarity
and its Control, 7 GER. L. J. 733, 736 (2006).
57. On collective action federalism, see generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 42.
58. See Maastricht TEU, supra note 33, art. 3(b), at 8 (introducing principle of
subsidiarity); see also ROBERT SCHÜTZE, FROM DUAL TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 247–49
(2009) (identifying Maastricht as the treaty in which subsidiarity became a “general
constitutional principle”).
59. Neville March Hunnings, Rival Constitutional Courts: A Comment on Case 106/77, 15
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 483, 485 (1978).
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action, be better achieved at the Union level.” Although application
of the principle is designed to assist in determining whether the
Union or the Member States should exercise competence over a
61
particular issue, subsidiarity had little bite prior to Lisbon. The ECJ
was the sole institution with authority to enforce the principle, and it
62
chose not to do so.
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the ECJ retains jurisdiction over
63
questions of subsidiarity, but the primary institutional responsibility
for monitoring subsidiarity has shifted. Recognizing the ECJ’s
reluctance to intercede with the Union institutions, the Treaty enlists
the national parliaments of the Member States—the new
“‘watchdogs’ of subsidiarity”—to police the boundaries of shared
64
powers. The process is straightforward: All “draft legislative acts”
must be forwarded by the proposing supranational institution (usually
65
the Commission) to the national parliaments, along with a statement
justifying the legislation as appropriate under the subsidiarity
66
principle, and including support “by qualitative and, wherever
67
After receiving the draft
possible, quantitative indicators.”
legislation, a national parliament has eight weeks to formulate its
68
69
response. If a national parliament, or a chamber therein,
determines that the proposed legislation does not comply with the
principle of subsidiarity, it may submit a reasoned opinion to that
effect to the Presidents of the European Parliament, Council, and
70
Commission.
60. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 50, art. 5(3), at 9 (emphasis added).
61. Thomas Horsley, Subsidiarity and the European Court of Justice: Missing Pieces in the
Subsidiarity Jigsaw?, 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 267, 268 (2012).
62. See SCHÜTZE, supra note 58, at 253–56.
63. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Protocol on the Application
of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality art. 7(2), Feb. 7, 1992, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1,
208 [hereinafter TEU Subsidiarity Protocol], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF.
64. Horsley, supra note 61, at 270.
65. TEU Subsidiarity Protocol, supra note 63, arts. 1–2, at 206. Draft legislative acts are
usually proposals from the Commission, but can include initiatives from a group of Member
States, or from the Parliament, the ECJ, the European Central Bank, or the European
Investment Bank. See id. art. 3, at 206.
66. Id. art 5, at 207.
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 6, at 207.
69. Id.
70. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Protocol on the Role of
National Parliaments in the European Union art. 3, Feb. 7, 1992, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 204
[hereinafter TEU National Parliaments Protocol], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF.
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The power of the mechanism is in the numbers: In order for their
reasoned opinions to have any effect, national parliaments must act in
concert. If they do so, they activate what is known as the “Early
Warning System” (EWS). Each national parliament in the European
Union receives two votes (for bicameral institutions, one vote is
allocated to each composite body). If reasoned opinions contesting
the exercise of EU competence on subsidiarity grounds represent
one-third of all possible votes, then the draft legislation must be
71
reviewed by the Union institutions. If reasoned opinions represent a
simple majority of possible votes, the Commission must review its
proposal, and if it chooses to continue with the proposed legislation, it
must also forward its justification (along with the opinions from the
national parliaments) to the Council and the Parliament. At this point,
a fifty-five percent majority of the Council or a simple majority of the
72
Parliament may force the abandonment of the proposal.
The combination of these two aspects of the Lisbon Treaty—
shared competence over migration and the related subsidiarity
review—provides new insight into how the immigration power is
73
conceptualized and its use at the supranational level justified.
Shortly after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the Commission
proposed a directive on work-force migration issues—the 2010
Seasonal Workers Directive. The proposed Directive’s lukewarm
reception by the national parliaments sheds light on the contours of
the underlying federalism debate and on the contested meaning of
subsidiarity.

71. TEU Subsidiarity Protocol, supra note 63, art. 7(2), at 208.
72. Id.
73. The Commission has had the right to initiate legislation since 2004 and thus the
opportunity to present immigration-related policies to the Council for review. Unanimity voting
in the Council was considered an appropriate substitute for robust subsidiarity review, as
Member State interests were thought, perhaps incorrectly, to be protected through Council
representation. Therefore, although the Commission provided some subsidiarity-based
justifications for its actions, those reasons were not scrutinized through any mechanism of
review. See Case C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2009 E.C.R. I-921
(interpreting the Qualification Directive without subsidiarity analysis). The advent of the EWS
should present opportunities for more robust reason-giving.
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C. Justifying Power and the Seasonal Workers Directive
In 2010, the European Commission prepared a “Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
conditions of entry and residence of TCNs for the purposes of
74
seasonal employment.” The proposal, as described by the
Commission, “establishes a fast-track procedure for the admission of
third-country seasonal workers, based on a common definition and
common criteria, in particular the existence of a work contract or a
binding job offer that specified a salary equal to or above a minimum
75
level.” The proposed Directive concerned “conditions of entry and
residence, and standards [of issuing] residence permits [by Member
States,] and the definition of rights of TCNs residing legally in a
76
Member State.” Limited by enumerated powers, the Commission
first identified the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) that supported its action—Article 79(2)(a)
77
and (b) —and then, given the shared power over migration,
conducted a subsidiarity review, providing reasons justifying Union
action.
The Commission identified four rationales supporting its proposal.
First, it argued that the Member States shared a common need for
seasonal workers, and that due to variation among Member States on
the national rights granted to TCNs, there could be problematic
distortions of migratory flows (presumably the danger of
oversubscription—too many TCNs seeking to enter a particular
Member State). Second, the Commission drew upon the existence of
open borders in the Schengen Area to argue for common rules on
entry to reduce the risk of overstaying and irregular (illegal)
migration. Third, it provided a rights-based rationale, identifying a
74. E.g., Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes
of Seasonal Employment, COM (2010) 379 final (July 13, 2010) [hereinafter Commission
Proposal].
75. Id. at 5.
76. Id. at 6.
77. TFEU, supra note 14, art. 79(2)(a)–(b), at 77.
For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures in the
following areas: (a) the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue
by Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the
purpose of family reunification; (b) the definition of the rights of third-country
nationals residing legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing
freedom of movement and of residence in other Member States[.]
Id.
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need to prevent exploitation and sub-standard working conditions for
TCNs in individual Member States by taking action at the Union
level. And fourth, it argued that a Union-level approach was
necessary for effective cooperation with third-countries on migration
issues, providing a “foreign policy” justification for supranational
78
action.
The proposed Seasonal Workers Directive generated more
responses from national parliaments than any other proposal in 2010,
engendering widespread discussion on both sides. Nine reasoned
opinions rejected the Commission’s professed competence to propose
79
such a directive on grounds of subsidiarity. These nine constituted
more than twenty-five percent of all reasoned opinions raising
80
subsidiarity concerns on all proposed legislation filed that year.
Other opinions supported the subsidiarity analysis, though some
81
nevertheless recommended amendments,
and two opinions
82
concluded that the proposal should fail on different grounds. The
number of reasoned opinions critical of the proposal fell well below
83
that needed to engage the EWS mechanisms, but the attention
84
nevertheless caused the Commission to issue a written response.

78. See Commission Proposal, supra note 74, at 6.
79. The European Commission refers to the report from the House of Commons of the
United Kingdom as a “reasoned opinion” in its Annex to its Subsidiary Report 2010. Report
from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, at 4, COM (2011) 344 final (June 10,
2011) (covering the year 2010) [hereinafter Subsidiarity Report 2010]. It is, however, referred to
as “other communication” by the House of Commons of the United Kingdom on its official
website. Subsidiarity: Reasoned Opinions, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk
/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/european-scrutiny-committee/scrutinyreserve-overrides/.
80. Subsidiary Report 2010, supra note 79, at 4.
81. See, e.g., BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR] 442/10 (Ger.), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/germany/2010_en.htm.
82. Subsidiarity Report 2010, supra note 79, at 7 (citing Latvian Saeima and Lithuanian
Seimas arguing the proposed Directive should fail on grounds of proportionality).
83. To have triggered automatic review in 2010, eighteen votes (eighteen reasoned
opinions in opposition to the proposal) would have been necessary.
84. Commission Reply to Opinions Concerning Subsidiarity Received from National
Parliaments on the Proposal for a Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of ThirdCountry Nationals for the Purposes of Seasonal Employment, COM (2010) 379 (Jan. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter Commission Reply], available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general
/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/united_kingdom/2010/com20100379/com20100379_commons
_reply_en.pdf. The Commission submitted one comprehensive answer in response to all the
various reasoned opinions.
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In general terms, the national parliaments opposing the proposed
Directive highlighted the shared power of the Member States in
migration issues, noting in particular Article 79(5), which reserves to
each Member State the power to determine the number of TCNs to
85
admit to its jurisdiction. The functional effects of this power,
86
unacknowledged in the Commission’s initial subsidiarity analysis,
drove many of the arguments against Union-level regulation. Specific
objections focused in large part on the Commission’s first three
justifications: smoothing migratory flows, reducing the risk of
irregular migration, and protecting the rights of TCNs.
In its critique of the Commission’s first justification—smoothing
migratory flows—the House of Commons of the United Kingdom
questioned the Commission’s analysis of the nature of the
competition distorting the migratory flow. It found “competition
between Member States to improve the conditions of employment for
temporary seasonal workers [to be] a sign of a healthy labour market,
87
not one that requires further regulatory intervention.” The Senate of
the Czech Republic argued that adequate regulation was possible on
the national level, and several opinions queried how the proposed
Directive would change the current competitive dynamic, given the
88
Member States’ individual control over numbers admitted. As the
House of Lords of the United Kingdom noted:
We can see that if one Member State grants seasonal workers
better minimum working conditions, this may make migration to
that State more attractive. This however would also happen under
the Directive, since (a) the rights granted under it . . . are simply
the minimal rights granted . . . and (b) the Member States remain
89
in control of admissions to their territory.

85. TFEU, supra note 14, art. 79(5), at 78.
86. Commission Proposal, supra note 74.
87. EUROPEAN SCRUTINY COMMITTEE, THE COMMITTEE’S CONCLUSION ON THE
SEASONAL WORKERS’ DIRECTIVE, 2010, H.C. 12208, at 2 (U.K.) [hereinafter U.K. HOUSE OF
COMMONS CONCLUSIONS], available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commonscommittees/european-scrutiny/13October2010.pdf.
88. Zákon č. 562/2010 Sb. (Czech), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/
relations/relations_other/npo/docs/czech_republic/2010/com20100379/com20100379_senate_opi
nion_en.pdf.
89. EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, SUBSIDIARITY ASSESSMENT: ADMISSION OF THIRDCOUNTRY NATIONALS AS SEASONAL WORKERS, 2010-2011, H.L. 35, at 4 (U.K.) [hereinafter
U.K. HOUSE OF LORDS SUBSIDIARITY ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2010/oct/eu-uk-hol-cttee-seasonal-workers.pdf.
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The Commission’s second justification—reducing the risk of
irregular migration—was met with similar derision by the national
parliaments. They acknowledged that any TCN who crossed an
internal border from one Member State into another could fall into
90
illegal status by remaining in that second Member State. But
national parliaments saw little evidence as to how harmonizing the
conditions of entry between Member States would discourage
91
irregular migration. Rather, national parliaments argued that the
absolute number of TCNs admitted to each Member State was the
more pertinent issue. If a Member State failed to calibrate the needs
of its labor market and admitted too many workers, the error might
result in irregular migration (TCNs seeking to move without
permission to other Member States). But as Member States retained
the ability to set those admission numbers under Article 79(5), the
issue of irregular migration could not be resolved by harmonized
92
regulations on entry.
Protecting the rights of TCNs—the Commission’s third
rationale—has important normative and rhetorical power in the
European Union. Calls for rights uniformity have encouraged a
centralizing tendency, even in the face of the renewed focus on
enumeration and categorization of Union powers. As Loïc Azoulai
has written, “[t]he centrality of the language of rights has superseded
the language of the division of powers in the realm of EU law. EU
rights . . . are functionally broad in their scope and not sector93
specific.” The principle of subsidiarity does not deny the relevance of
rights or their uniform application, but the analysis does require a
determination that rights protection is better done at the central level.
Building on this prong of the analysis, the British Parliament and the
Austrian Bundesrat seriously questioned the Commission’s
conclusion that EU action was needed. The House of Commons of the
90. Reasoned Opinion from the Senate of the Republic of Poland on the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Conditions of Entry and
Residence of Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Seasonal Employment, PARL. EUR.
DOC. CM 835429 (2010), available at http://www.europarl.eruopa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/
documents/juri/cm/835/835429/835429en.pdf (“In a situation where EU regulations do not
envisage the free movement of employees from third countries between Member States, and
permits are issued by national authorities and have no more than national scope, there is no
need to harmonise the regulations affecting the issue of permits for seasonal employment.”).
91. See, e.g., U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS CONCLUSIONS, supra note 87, at 3.
92. See TFEU, supra note 14, art. 79(5), at 78.
93. Loïc Azoulai, Introduction to DECONSTRUCTING EU FEDERALISM THROUGH
COMPETENCES 1, 2 (Loïc Azoulai et al. eds., 2011), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/
intalcdi/PE/2012/10631.pdf.
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United Kingdom, citing the Commission’s impact assessment, argued
that poor working conditions derive from national “deficiencies” such
as “lax enforcement,” an issue that would be difficult to solve by EU
94
action and that went unaddressed by the proposed Directive.
In its written response, the European Commission, without
contributing much new information or argumentation, reiterated its
concern about migratory flows and the possibility that they would be
distorted due to varying rules in the Member States. But it strongly
denied the argument that the Article 79(5) power was of greater
importance than conditions of entry. The fact that Member States set
the numbers of admitted TCNs “in no way annul[led] the validity of
the argument about distortion of migratory flows. Indeed, quotas have
to be viewed as only one element impacting migratory flows. Another,
equally important aspect is the attractiveness of the national
95
schemes.”
The one rationale that the national parliaments did not
meaningfully consider was the Commission’s final justification for
Union action: more effective cooperation with third countries. The
96
97
argument was described as “unpersuasive,”
“inadequate,”
98
99
unacceptable, and offering “no added value.” But the Commission’s
rationale was both serious and embedded in a political context wellknown to the Member States. The connection between immigration
policy and foreign policy had been made explicit in a series of earlier
efforts by the Commission to advocate for a “Comprehensive” or
100
This approach seeks to
“Global Approach” to immigration.
94. U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS CONCLUSIONS, supra note 87, at 3; see also U.K. HOUSE OF
LORDS SUBSIDIARITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 89, at 5 (“Measures of national law are of
course binding and enforceable, and are at least as effective as EU measures in overcoming
exploitation.”); see also Bundesrat [BR] [Federal Council], ¶ 5 (Austria) [hereinafter Austrian
Bundesrat Opinion], available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_
other/npo/docs/austria/2010/com20100379/com20100379_bundesrat_opinion_en.pdf (“Although
protection against social dumping is an important aim that should be given increased attention
in all European Union measures, in this specific case there is once again no transborder
problem.”).
95. Commission Reply, supra note 84, at 2.
96. U.K. HOUSE OF LORDS SUBSIDIARITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 89, at 5.
97. Austrian Bundesrat Opinion, supra note 94, ¶ 8.
98. See U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS CONCLUSIONS, supra note 87, at 3.
99. Statement from the Eerste Kamer and the Tweede Kamer [Senate and House of
Representatives], Subsidiarity Test of the Proposal for a Directive Concerning the Conditions for
Access to and Residence in the EU of Subjects of Third Countries, with a View to Seasonal
Employment, Oct. 14, 2010 (Neth.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/
relations/relations_other/npo/netherlands/2010_en.htm.
100. See Carole Vogel, The Migration-Development Nexus: Is the Migration Policy of the
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determine immigration policy in light of its “foreign policy
101
implications and the implications which foreign policy has for it.” In
making this connection in the context of the Seasonal Workers
Directive, the Commission found “an undeniable link between
migration and development. A common European Union legal
regime on third-country seasonal workers has been long awaited by
some third-countries and it is viewed as an important element of the
European Union migration policy with a potential significant impact
102
on the development policy.”
Although more national parliaments challenged the Seasonal
Workers Directive than they did any other Commission proposal in
103
2010 or 2011, the EWS was not activated. The proposed Directive
therefore progressed to the next stage of the legislative process and is
still being reviewed by the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers. Without action from the national parliaments, the only
remaining institution able to slow or stop the Directive on subsidiarity
grounds is the ECJ.
As previously discussed, the ECJ has not approached the
subsidiarity analysis with any rigor, but it nevertheless provides the
background legal norms against which to make an assessment of the
Commission’s reasoning. In two recent opinions, the ECJ confirmed
that in examining compliance with the subsidiarity principle, it would
look to the Commission’s report to determine the rationales provided
104
for supranational action. The ECJ will not rank the Commission’s
justifications nor does it require a justification directed to each
105
legislative choice.
Thus, in the shadow of ECJ review, the
European Union Coherent with its Development Policy?, in EUROPEAN MIGRATION AND
ASYLUM POLICIES: COHERENCE OR CONTRADICTION? 273, 277 (Cristina Gortázar et al. eds.,
2012) (“The commission has always seen itself as the ‘motor’ behind the Global Approach.”);
Sandra Lavenex, Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control, 29
W. EUR. POL. 329, 333 (2006) (using the term “Comprehensive Approach”).
101. van Selm, supra note 38, at 143–44.
102. See Commission Reply, supra note 84, at 3.
103. See generally Report from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, at 7,
COM (2012) 373 final (July 10, 2012) [hereinafter Subsidiarity Report 2011], available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/documents/com_2012_0373_en.pdf;
Subsidiarity Report 2010, supra note 79.
104. Subsidiarity Report 2011, supra note 103. See generally Case C-176/09, Grand Duchy of
Lux. v. Parliament and Council, 2009 E.C.R. I-3727; Case C-58/08, The Queen v. Sec’y of State
for Bus., Enter. & Regulatory Reform, 2008 E.C.R. I-4999.
105. TFEU, supra note 14, art. 296, at 175–76 requires that “[l]egal acts shall state the
reasons on which they are based.” Yet, the Commission need not even make express reference
to the principle of subsidiarity to satisfy that requirement; instead, according to the ECJ, it is
enough for the Commission to give reasons that simply imply conformity with the principle of
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Commission needs only one generally applicable rationale to justify
its power.
In the context of the Seasonal Workers Directive, the
Commission’s first three grounds, while plausible, are hardly
incontrovertible arguments for supranational action. The Member
States have a strong retort: The number of admitted TCNs is the
driving factor behind both migratory flow and the possibility of
negative externalities between or among Member States, and without
addressing that issue—which the Union cannot do under the Treaty—
Union-wide action on conditions of entry would be of little value. But
even accepting these Member-State counterarguments, only one
persuasive rationale is necessary to make the case for supranational
power. And the Commission’s final rationale, the foreign policy
justification, went mostly uncontested by the national parliaments.
Whether the foreign policy rationale will continue to be used by
the Commission is uncertain but not unlikely—at least one European
scholar contends that it is “the strongest argument” in favor of Union
action over immigration, as the need to ensure a unified voice in
foreign policy matters can give support to supranational action “even
106
in situations purely internal to one Member State.” As the reasoned
opinions on the Seasonal Workers Directive demonstrate, there is a
decided lack of attention by the national parliaments to this line of
reasoning. But the expansive potential of the reasoning is clear from
the commentary and, as will be shown, from the experiences of the
United States—an argument that can reach even the “purely internal”
affairs of a Member State is powerful indeed.
II. THE FEDERAL PLENARY POWER OVER IMMIGRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
As in today’s European Union, the locus of immigration power
was not clearly defined in the early United States. Notwithstanding
modern acceptance of immigration as a federal power, American
history demonstrates that, prior to 1875, both the states and the
federal government enacted laws that regulated the entry and
conditions of entry for immigrants. The result was a “complex hybrid
107
of state and federal policy,” which shares important parallels with
subsidiarity. See Case C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 1997 E.C.R. I-2405, ¶ 28.
Cf. Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, 2001 E.C.R. 1-07079, ¶ 33.
106. Kocharov, supra note 54, at 20.
107. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
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108

the EU dynamic outlined in Part I. When the U.S. federal
government finally took a more active approach to regulating
immigration, it too needed to provide a persuasive rationale to justify
federal action. The Supreme Court drew on a number of different
justifications for the recognition of federal immigration power,
including arguments based on the Constitution. Some of this
reasoning is naturally quite distinct from that provided by the
European Commission, but one of the Court’s key justifications, and
the one on which it relied heavily in the early years of federal
regulation, was the link between immigration and “foreign affairs.”
This persuasive justification took on great doctrinal significance in the
decades after its articulation, structuring what are now entrenched
federal-state relations in the immigration area.
This Part begins by providing an overview of immigration policy
in the early (pre-1875) United States to demonstrate the historical
praxis of immigration regulation and the questions surrounding the
scope of federal power. It then outlines and assesses the rationales
adopted by the Supreme Court to justify federal action, with a
particular focus on the foreign affairs justification. The Part concludes
by discussing how American federalism has been affected by the
Court’s reliance on the nexus between immigration and foreign
affairs.
A. A Hybrid Beginning
As is the Treaty of Lisbon, the U.S. Constitution is a document of
delegated, or enumerated, powers. The Constitution does not provide
a specific grant of power to regulate immigration. It does, however,
state: “The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o establish a uniform rule
109
of naturalization” and “[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary
110
and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing power[].” The
delegation of the naturalization power to Congress stemmed from the
perceived inadequacies of the system of government under the
Articles of Confederation. The Articles guaranteed open borders and
free movement between states, and entitled free inhabitants of any
one state “to the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several

COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1896 (1993). See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996).
108. See supra Part I.
109. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
110. Id. at cl. 18.
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111

states.” This dynamic created tension, as the state with the most
lenient standard of residency would set citizenship qualifications for
112
the entire confederation. Allocating naturalization power to the
federal level eliminated an individual state’s ability to serve as
113
national gatekeeper, as the federal government would be able to
114
impose a uniform rule of naturalization on all states.
Notwithstanding this federal allocation, states continued to
promulgate their own naturalization laws well into the 1790s—an
115
indication of the slow acceptance of national power.
Aside from naturalization, the Constitution provided only
116
“nonexistent or vague” references to citizenship and immigration,
and Congress’s power to regulate immigration was at issue in debates
over bills throughout the 1790s and early 1800s. The Alien Act of 1798
gave the President power to “order to depart” those aliens he
determined to be “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United
117
States.” Opponents argued “that Congress had been delegated no
118
power to control the admission of aliens,” and that “the power of
119
admitting foreigners . . . remained with the states.” In other contexts,
111. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. 4.
[T]he free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from
Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in
the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to
and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants
thereof respectively . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
112. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 237 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
113. See E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
1798-1965 11 (1981) (noting debate in the House of Representatives promoting a national rule
of naturalization, and in particular a comment by Senator Robert Sherman of Connecticut, in
which he advocated for such a rule “‘in order to prevent particular states receiving citizens, and
forcing them upon others who would not have received them’” (citation omitted)).
114. Congress passed the first national naturalization legislation in 1790, requiring three
years of residency before an individual was eligible to naturalize. It changed the requirement to
five years in 1795, and then to fourteen years in 1798 (as part of the legislation surrounding the
infamous Alien and Sedition Acts), but returned to five years in 1802. See id. at 11–17.
115. See JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870
219 (1978).
116. MICHAEL C. LEMAY, FROM OPEN DOOR TO DUTCH DOOR 20 (1987).
117. An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired 1800).
118. Neuman, supra note 107, at 1881.
119. Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Forgiveness, 45
CONN. L. REV. 743, 762 & n.97 (2013) [hereinafter Lindsay, Constitution of Forgiveness]
(quoting 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 1986 (1799) (statement of Rep. Otis)); see id. at 762 (discussing
the contemporary presumption that “the individual states had ‘reserved to themselves the
power of regulating what relates to emigrants’” (citation omitted)). See also Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth-Century Origins
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debate focused on whether the commerce clause, giving Congress
power to regulate commerce among the several states, might allow
120
Congress to pass immigration-related laws. But commerce was a
more circumscribed concept then. For example, constitutional
justification for a federal quarantine law failed, as quarantines were
considered to fall under the state police powers and were thus outside
121
congressional reach.
Congress passed the first bill regulating immigration, or more
122
accurately, the conditions of immigration, in 1819. The Passenger
Act limited the number of passengers that could be transported on
ships, required that ships leaving the United States bound for Europe
provide passengers certain amounts of food and water, and created a
123
reporting system for passenger data. These new minimum standards
for steerage class resulted in increased ticket prices for the cheapest
124
accommodations, which had a disparate impact on immigrants. But
there is no evidence in the congressional debates that Congress’s
125
purpose was to restrict immigration; rather the legislative history
demonstrates Congress was concerned about the high mortality rates
126
on Atlantic crossings.
During this time period and until the Civil War, states legislated
on various aspects of immigration policy; beyond public health
regulation (such as the quarantine provisions mentioned above),
127
states regulated “the movement of the poor” and sought both to
encourage and to manage immigration flows. The poor had few
friends in nineteenth-century America: Many states passed anti128
pauper laws, and, like TCNs in today’s European Union, the
of Plenary Power over Foreign Relations, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 88–98 (2002) (discussing debates
over the Alien Act).
120. Neuman, supra note 107, at 1864.
121. Id.
122. HUTCHINSON, supra note 113, at 22.
123. Id. (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 22 n.40.
125. Martin Schain suggests the law was designed to “discourage the immigration of
paupers.” SCHAIN, supra note 2, at 190. Yet, Hutchinson found no evidence of that purpose in
the debates. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 113, at 22. In fact, in 1855, an attempt to prevent the
immigration of criminals and the poor “triggered states’ rights objections in the Senate and
rejection by the House of Representatives.” Neuman, supra note 107, at 1859.
126. See Neuman, supra note 107, at 21 (“In urging the need for such legislation, it was
reported that during the preceding year 1,000 out of 5,000 persons who had sailed from
Antwerp died on the voyage.”).
127. Id. at 1841 (mentioning, in addition, “regulation of the movement of criminals,
regulation of slavery, and other policies of racial subordination”).
128. SCHAIN, supra note 2, at 190.
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nineteenth-century poor could not move freely. This limitation
made poor laws a useful tool against unwanted immigrants:
“Unnaturalized immigrants remained permanently subject to
deportation under the provisions of the poor laws empowering local
officials to seek an order causing paupers without settlement to be
130
sent back where they ‘belonged’ at public expense.” Not all state
efforts were restrictive or discriminatory, however. In 1845, Michigan
and other states encouraged immigration by opening offices of
131
foreign emigration; the State of New York’s Commissioners of
Emigration were responsible not only for “passenger reporting and
bonding, [but also for] the protection of immigrants from fraud and
132
abuse.” The states were also responsible for processing the
thousands of incoming people. In 1855, New York opened the Castle
133
Garden Emigrant Landing Depot, which received eight million
immigrants by 1892, when the federal government opened Ellis
134
Island.
The immigration system prior to 1875 “evolved informally from
concurrent policies” enacted at both levels of government, and there
is some indication that this historical fact reflects the contemporary
understanding of the constitutional powers. As Gerald Neuman has
argued, “a truly exclusive federal power over interstate and
international migration would have been highly threatening under
135
antebellum conditions.” The threat of free movement of persons, in
particular that of freed slaves or free blacks, gave strong impetus to

129. See Neuman, supra note 107, at 1846–47, 1867 n.72 (“The right of the poor to travel
was not vindicated until Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).”); cf. Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
41 U.S. 539, 625 (1842) (holding that states retained their police power to restrict the movement
of a specific class of people—slaves).
130. Neuman, supra note 107, at 1852.
131. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MICHIGAN 14–15, available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/
documents/publications/manual/2001-2002/2001-mm-0003-0026-History.pdf; see also LEMAY,
supra note 116, at 34 (“By the 1870s, twenty-five of the then thirty-eight states took some sort of
official action designed to promote immigration. South Carolina went so far as to grant a fiveyear tax exemption on all real estate bought by immigrants.”).
132. Neuman, supra note 107, at 1855.
133. LEMAY, supra note 116, at 17.
134. Maryellen Fullerton, A Tale of Two Decades: War Refugees and Asylum Policy in the
European Union, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 87, 91 n.8 (2011) (citing Castle Clinton
National Monument, History & Culture, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/cacl/
historyculture/index.htm (last visited May 6, 2013)).
135. Neuman, supra note 107, at 1889; see also Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of
the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 612 (2008) (“A strong statement
regarding the federal government's control over the migration of people among the states would
have suggested federal authority to regulate (and perhaps prohibit) the domestic slave trade.”).
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the slave states to maintain control over the rights of entry into their
136
communities.
Some have linked this slave power, and its
constitutional protections, to the existence of concurrent state and
137
federal competence over immigration. Of course, this historical
argument is not dispositive: Congress may have decided not to act in
the area, even with a credible claim to exclusive authority, due to “the
138
strong and rising state rights sentiment” in the antebellum years.
Nevertheless, and for whatever reason, the shared efforts in the
sphere of immigration were an ongoing aspect of early American
history and led to critical tensions between the federal and state
governments in the late nineteenth-century.
B. Federal Exclusivity and Foreign Affairs
In Europe, the Commission proposed supranational legislation to
address a question of immigration, and its action required persuasive
justification under the Lisbon Treaty. In contrast, in the United States,
direct tension between federal and state governments brought the
issue of power over immigration to the forefront. By the mid-1870s,
certain receiving-states, such as New York and California, sought to
profit from migration, while still limiting that migration for both
economic and racist reasons. Their policies stood in tension with the
national need for immigrants to power the western expansion and rise
of industry. This societal conflict would eventually find its way to the
139
Supreme Court. The initial skirmishes were over state laws and
actions that threatened the national project; only later were federal
laws, and the power to enact them, at issue. The Supreme Court
identified a positive federal power over immigration that would serve
both to preempt state action as a constitutional matter (preventing
state action even in the absence of federal law) and to justify federal
regulatory action itself.

136. Neuman, supra note 107, at 1866–67.
137. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511–22 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(finding “an acknowledgment of [federal immigration] power (as well as of the States' similar
power, subject to federal abridgment) . . . in Art. I, § 9, which provided that ‘[t]he Migration or
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall
not be prohibited’” by Congress prior to 1808); see also Rodríguez, supra note 135, at 612
(linking the existence of the slave trade to notions of concurrent power).
138. HUTCHINSON, supra note 113, at 45.
139. Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341, 353
(2008) (“Power struggles between the national government and immigrant-receiving states like
New York and California are part of what gave rise to the plenary power doctrine in the
nineteenth century.”).
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Between 1875 and 1895, the Supreme Court articulated a number
of theories under which it concluded that the federal government had
exclusive power to regulate immigration. Purely textual arguments
were limited; there was a marked failure to engage with or rely on the
140
Naturalization Clause. Instead, the three main theories discussed
were tied explicitly to foreign affairs: First, regulating immigration, or
immigrants more specifically, could be understood as part of
Congress’s power to regulate foreign commerce; second, a type of
collective action federalism argument rooted in the nature of foreign
affairs could require national action over immigration; and third,
immigration power could be seen as an incident of national
sovereignty. The final two justifications were carried forward into
twentieth-century jurisprudence. Critical to both of these foreign
affairs arguments is the fact that all immigrants, by virtue of being
immigrants, must be citizens, nationals, or subjects of a foreign
country, thus creating an indelible link between immigration and
141
foreign relations.
Early cases seemed to locate the federal immigration power in the
142
federal government’s power to regulate foreign commerce, but they
left unspecified the exact connection between commerce and the
internal labor market. In 1875, the Supreme Court heard a series of
cases challenging state statutes that compelled “owners of vessels to
pay a sum of money for every passenger brought by them from a
143
144
foreign shore.” In Henderson v. Mayor of New York, Justice Miller
concluded that New York’s bond system was the functional equivalent
145
of a tax and thus unconstitutional. He described the “transportation
of passengers from European ports to those of the United States” as
“a part of our commerce with foreign nations,” due to the immigrants’

140. Modern cases, however, frequently cite the Naturalization Clause as contributing to
the federal power over immigration. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (finding federal
authority to rest “in part” on the Naturalization Clause).
141. As noted, supra note 16, a small number of people are stateless.
142. These cases reflected antebellum attitudes that “federal authority over immigration,
whatever its extent, derived from Congress’s constitutionally enumerated commerce power.”
Lindsay, Constitution of Forgiveness, supra note 119, at 778 (citing City of New York v. Miln, 36
U.S. 102 (1837), and The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849)).
143. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 268 (1875).
144. 92 U.S. 259 (1875). The case was joined with Commissioners of Immigration v. North
German Lloyd (the second case concerned an identical statute in Louisiana).
145. Id. at 274–75. A direct tax would have been unlawful as an impermissible regulation of
commerce, under The Passenger Cases, decided in 1849. See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283
(1849).
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146

connection to the labor market.
147
In Chy Lung v. Freeman, Miller considered a California statute
that required payments from ship owners for certain passengers but
went beyond New York’s terms by giving unlimited discretion to a
state official to determine who should be required to pay. Having
been selected as one who needed a bond paid on her behalf, a
Chinese woman was not permitted to land as the ship owner refused
to pay; she was detained on the ship and filed a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the statute. Miller concluded that the power to pass “laws
which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign
nations” belongs to Congress, by virtue of its power to regulate
148
foreign commerce, and not to the states. The woman in this case,
however, was not evidently in the class of laborers described in
Henderson, and Miller provided no further explanation of the specific
connection to foreign commerce. As late as 1884, in Edye v.
149
Robertson,
Miller described immigration as the “business of
150
bringing foreigners to this country,” thus incorporating it as a
151
“branch of commerce.” Given the efforts of the Court in the 1920s
and 1930s to insulate labor as an area of traditional state concern in
152
the domestic commerce clause project, these types of foreign
commerce clause arguments (standing on their own and unconnected
to a more general foreign affairs power) were not favored in later
153
cases.
146. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270–71.
[Immigrants] bring still more largely the labor which we need to till our soil, build our
railroads, and develop the latent resources of the country in its minerals, its
manufactures, and its agriculture. Is the regulation of this great system a regulation of
commerce? Can it be doubted that a law which prescribes the terms on which vessels
shall engage in it is a law regulating this branch of commerce?
Id. Justice Miller believed the federal power over commerce was exclusive and did not agree
that states had concurrent power to regulate where Congress had not done so. But, he added,
even under a theory of concurrent powers, the New York regulation must fail as the system
which it attempted to regulate was “international,” belonging “to that class of laws which
concern the exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations and governments.” Id. at
273.
147. 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
148. Id. at 280.
149. (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
150. Id. at 595.
151. Lindsay, Constitution of Forgiveness, supra note 119, at 792.
152. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1936) (holding that the state
retains the power to regulate hours and wages in the coal industry); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251, 275–76 (1918) (holding that it is incumbent on the states to regulate the employment
of children).
153. Matthew Lindsay suggests that in 1889, the Supreme Court “precipitous[ly]

DELANEY 10.20.2013 (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

10/21/2013 7:27 PM

JUSTIFYING POWER

183

Justice Miller also introduced a second theory in Chy Lung—a
justification for federal power over immigration reflecting a
154
subsidiarity or collective action-type federalism analysis. By virtue
of its regulation of aliens, as citizens or subjects of a foreign country,
California’s action was seen as necessarily tied to foreign affairs.
Using the logic of federalism and this connection between
immigration and foreign affairs, Miller argued that the power over
entry should rest with the federal government. Focusing on the
implications of unilateral action by a state in a federal system, he
highlighted the likelihood of externalities caused by this regulation
negatively affecting the other states. He presented a hypothetical:
What if California had prevented the entry of British, rather than
Chinese, subjects? Such a powerful country might make a claim for
redress, and in so doing, would make it upon the United States as a
whole, not merely on California. If war ensued, “would California
155
alone suffer, or all the Union?” Miller determined that the
Constitution, which clearly recognizes the dangers of unilateral state
action by giving certain powers to the federal government, would not
do “so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to pass
laws whose enforcement renders the general government liable to just
156
reclamations which it must answer.” His argument gains additional
force from the knowledge that, in 1789, foreign affairs powers
themselves were granted to the federal government precisely because
157
of the interstate conflicts they threatened. Because the type of
abandon[ed]” the otherwise “long-standing Commerce Clause framework.” Matthew J.
Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal
Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) [hereinafter Lindsay, Immigration
as Invasion]. See also Cleveland, supra note 119, at 133–34 (discussing abandonment of foreign
commerce clause approach). Lindsay is certainly correct that the Court no longer uses the
foreign commerce clause as a stand-alone justification for power over immigration; it is
nevertheless often included in the list of reasons undergirding federal authority over
immigration. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (“Federal authority to regulate the
status of aliens derives from various sources, including the Federal Government's power ‘[t]o
establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ its power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations,’ and its broad authority over foreign affairs.” (citations omitted)).
154. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1875).
155. Id. at 279.
156. Id. at 280.
157. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 21 (John Jay) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (arguing in
favor of a national government because “[u]nder the National Government, treaties and articles
of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in
the same manner; whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States . . .
will not always accord or be consistent”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, at 30 (John Jay) (E.H. Scott
ed., 1898) (arguing against multiple states or confederacies because they “would neither love
nor trust one another; but, on the contrary, would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual
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tensions that immigration regulation would cause were thought to be
foreign relations tensions, the two areas meshed perfectly together.
The theory behind this foreign affairs justification for federal
immigration power is thus the closest to that presented by the
Commission in its view of “foreign policy.”
In part because of the Court’s determination that the states could
158
not take action in this manner, Congress passed its first Immigration
Act in 1875, which prevented criminals from entering the country and
which prohibited the importation of Chinese women for immoral
159
purposes. A series of immigration and naturalization acts followed
160
in 1882, 1891, and 1906. Also in the 1880s, Congress passed a series
of acts that directly focused on immigration from China. The Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, amended and extended by acts in 1884 and
1888, prevented Chinese laborers from entering the United States and
required those present to obtain a certificate for reentry before
161
leaving the country. Eventually, the amendments of 1888 prohibited
162
163
reentry completely. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the Court
considered whether Congress had the power to pass the 1888 Act.
After concluding that the terms of various treaties with China did not
limit congressional action in the area, the Court sought to identify the
positive authority of the federal government to pass the legislation.
Like the Court in Chy Lung, the Court in Chae Chan Ping
grounded Congress’s immigration power in the federal government’s
power over foreign affairs. Unlike Justice Miller, who seemed to
justify federal power by reasoning that the admission of immigrants is
a matter better addressed at the federal level, Justice Field introduced
the third type of foreign affairs justification: Because the United
States is a sovereign nation, it must have the powers incidental to
164
sovereignty, including “the power of exclusion of foreigners.” This
injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in which some nations
doubtless wish to see us, in which we should be, formidable only to each other”).
158. HUTCHINSON, supra note 113, at 66 (“Almost by default the regulation of immigration
was falling to the federal government, and the representatives of the states that had formerly
opposed federal intervention were now asking for it.”).
159. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.
160. E.g., Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, 34 Stat. 596; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat.
1084.
161. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
162. See Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504. For a discussion of the various Chinese
Exclusion Acts and their evolution, see generally MARTIN B. GOLD, FORBIDDEN CITIZENS:
CHINESE EXCLUSION AND THE U.S. CONGRESS (2012).
163. (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
164. Id. at 609.
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“incident of sovereignty” should be considered part of the sovereign
powers delegated to the United States by the Constitution, including
the powers “to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel
invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments
165
to the states, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship.”
Justice Field linked the power to exclude most closely with the power
to conduct war: “It matters not in what form such aggression and
encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its
national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon
166
us.” And no actual war was required to give Congress this power: If
foreign persons are “dangerous to . . . peace and security, their
exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual
167
hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects.” Thus
Justice Field, by tying immigration to foreign affairs and then to
sovereignty, created a powerful argument for federal plenary power
168
over immigration. A sovereign must have the power to exclude and,
as would be made clear in subsequent cases, expel unwanted
169
persons.
C. The Plenary Power and Federalism in the United States
The Court’s link between foreign affairs and immigration has had
a sweeping effect. The Court has determined that the federal
government has a plenary power over foreign affairs, or in other
words, a “comprehensive power to conduct foreign relations without
170
interference or limitation by the states.”
By incorporating
immigration into this context—whether for reasons of inherent
sovereignty or collective action federalism—the federal government
now has “plenary power” over immigration. This “sovereign
nonenumerated Congressional power” has created a number of
171
problematic knock-on effects. The effects on the federal dynamic in
165. Id. at 604.
166. Id. at 606.
167. Id.
168. This inherent sovereignty argument was further elaborated by Justice Gray in
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (finding as “an accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to
admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe”).
169. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1892).
170. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 1620 (1997).
171. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 274 (1984).
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the United States are the most relevant for the comparison with
Europe and will be addressed first and in more depth. As a matter of
constitutional and political tension in immigration matters, federalism
is only now reemerging as an issue. The implications of the federal
plenary power over immigration for judicial review and separation of
powers are considered more important in the American context but,
for purposes of this comparative project, will be touched on only
briefly.
Notwithstanding its articulation of a broad federal power over
immigration, the Court has attempted to retain some areas of state
regulation by distinguishing between those regulations, exclusive to
federal power, that affect the conditions of entry and selection of
immigrants, and others, regulating aliens more generally, that states
172
may pass. But this dividing line has been hard to maintain. As soon
173
as it was formulated, it came under pressure. In the 1915 case Traux
174
v. Raich, the Court found unconstitutional an Arizona state law
175
regulating the employment of aliens. It concluded that “[t]he
assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning
a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the state would be tantamount
to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and abode, for in
176
ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.” But what
about “housing, education, or health care—the denial of which
177
threatens an immigrant’s ability to survive as a new resident”?
Where do the conditions of entry end? As Adam Cox has persuasively

172. Cox, supra note 139, at 346 (“[T]he plenary power doctrine is important because it is
widely understood to draw a sharp constitutional distinction between rules that select
immigrants and rules that otherwise regulate them.”).
173. This is not surprising. As Ernie Young has written, “exclusive spheres of authority
simply cannot be defined and maintained in a principled way.” Ernest A. Young, The Puzzling
Persistence of Dual Federalism, NOMOS LIV: LIBERTY (forthcoming) (manuscript at 42),
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2689. Young discusses the
pressures of dual federalism, and notes:
Dual federalism died . . . because the Court found itself unable to draw determinate
lines to define the exclusive sphere of state authority into which national power might
not enter. That problem applies equally, however, to attempts to define and police an
exclusive sphere of National authority; it thus plagues the contemporary cases in
which courts have sought to keep states out of ‘uniquely federal’ fields like foreign
affairs . . . or immigration.
Id. at 3.
174. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
175. Id. at 42–43.
176. Id. at 42.
177. Erin F. Delaney, Note, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce
Clause Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 1845 (2007).
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argued, most of these rules regulating aliens can impact “where and
178
how noncitizens live.”
Apart from its internal weakness, the Court’s attempt to maintain
a sphere of state power looks even less persuasive given the foreign
affairs rationale, which is capacious, especially in light of increasing
179
globalization. Due to the fact that most every immigrant is from a
foreign country, most any state regulation that affects aliens
(regardless of its substance) can be seen to have a connection to
180
foreign affairs, thus threatening the national interest and justifying
181
constitutional preemption even in the absence of federal action. The
application of this reasoning reached its zenith (or nadir) in Zschernig
182
v. Miller, a case challenging an Oregon law that required personal
property of a decedent in Oregon to escheat to the State, rather than
go to a nonresident alien, unless reciprocal rights to inherit were
183
provided for American citizen-heirs in foreign countries. The Court
found it “inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon
enforce[d] affect[ed] international relations in a persistent and subtle
way[,] . . . impair[ing] the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign
184
policy.” It is of some question what actual effect probate laws in
Oregon would have had or did have on foreign affairs, and the case is
seen as an exemplar of the sweeping reach of the foreign affairs
185
rationale behind the federal plenary power over immigration.
The Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution did little to affect
immigration; given immigration’s connection to foreign affairs, an
186
area in which “the states do not exist,” it is hardly surprising that
178. Cox, supra note 139, at 389.
179. Young, supra note 173, at 35 (“In our increasingly globalized world, no governmental
actor—including states and even localities—can avoid interacting with the rest of the world in a
way that implicates national foreign policy.”).
180. See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 9 VA. L. REV. 601, 626 (2013) (“If the
Court characterized the statute in question as involving ‘foreign affairs,’ it would fall; if not, it
would stand. But almost any regulation of immigrants could in theory affect ‘foreign affairs,’ so
the scope of this use of plenary power was constantly shifting.”).
181. Legomsky, supra note 171, at 262 (“The connection between immigration and foreign
policy derives ultimately from the fact that an immigration decision operates on the subject of a
foreign state. Because a foreign state may intervene diplomatically on behalf of its nationals, an
adverse decision carries the potential for international tension.”).
182. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
183. Id. at 430–31.
184. Id. at 440.
185. See Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J.
INT’L L. 832, 836 (1989) (“No one of [the Court’s] conclusions is effectively supported by the
facts in the Zschernig case.”).
186. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 149–50
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there was little effort to impose on the immigration power the type of
federalism constraints seen in the evolution of the commerce clause
187
doctrine. The constitutional limitations have not prevented scholars
from making policy-based arguments, encouraging Congress to
empower the states to take action, or arguing that states may be
better placed to address immigration related issues, such as promoting
188
189
integration or identifying labor needs.
Although not as relevant to the European Union, it is important
to note that the plenary power doctrine has also put pressure on the
relationship between Congress and the Executive: If the general
power over immigration is grounded in the sovereignty of the federal
government, can it be confined to Congress? How should executive
190
power be analyzed? And finally, the link between foreign affairs and
the political question doctrine has allowed and perhaps encouraged
the federal courts to give Congress tremendous leeway in its actions
191
in the immigration sphere. The doctrine’s influence on judicial
review has rightly caused considerable outrage among scholars and
others in the United States, as congressional action has been insulated
(2d ed. 1997).
187. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
188. Rodríguez, supra note 135, at 581.
189. Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 787, 833 (2008). Identifying labor needs—particularly in terms of numbers—is a
responsibility often exercised at the subnational level of federations. In addition to the EU,
Germany and Canada have decentralized labor structures. See Jeffrey Sack, U.S. and Canadian
Labour Law: Significant Distinctions, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 241, 242 (2010) (“In Canada,
labour relations is mainly a provincial responsibility, with only 8.4% of the work force under
federal jurisdiction.”); Conny Wunsch, Labour Market Policy in Germany: Institutions,
Instruments and Reforms Since Unification (University of St. Gallen Dept. of Economics
Discussion Paper No. 2005-06, 2005) at 14, available at http://www1.vwa.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp
2005/DP-06_Wu.pdf (describing how a 2002 reform of German labor market policy placed more
power in the hands of subnational labor offices to set needs according to local market
conditions).
190. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 464 (2009) (explaining how the President can implement “remarkable change” in
immigration policy even in the absence of congressional action); Christopher N. Lasch, How the
Court’s Upholding of Federal Immigration Enforcement Authority in Arizona v. United States
Casts Doubt on the Validity of Federal Immigration Detainers, 46 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 58–60), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2178524
(discussing how implications of Arizona (and plenary congressional power) might affect
executive program of immigration detainers); Neuman, supra note 107, at 1840 (discussing
uncertainty about the distribution of immigration power between Congress and the President).
191. See Legomsky, supra note 171, at 262 (“[I]t ignores reality to hold that every provision
concerned with immigration, as applied to every fact situation it might encompass, is so
intimately rooted in foreign policy that the usual scope of judicial review would hamper the
effective conduct of foreign relations.”).
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192

from meaningful rights review.

* * *
The federal plenary power over immigration is largely rooted in
the connection between immigration and foreign affairs. The early
rationales for federal power have shaped the current constitutional
understanding of the immigration power and the way in which it has
constructed federal-state relations. The link between immigrants,
necessarily from foreign countries, and foreign relations is a powerful
justification for exclusive federal action—whether under a theory of
collective action federalism (or subsidiarity), or due to the federal
government’s inherent sovereignty. Because both theories are tied up
in the evolution of the doctrine, it is difficult to identify the weights
193
accorded to each. Nevertheless, given that a theory of subsidiarity
contributed in some way to locating immigration power in the United
States, there are possible lessons for the European Union as it faces a
similar question.
III. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE FUTURE OF EU IMMIGRATION
REGULATION
Because the European Union and the United States are systems
of enumerated powers, the Commission in the European Union and
the Supreme Court in the United States have needed to provide
reasons for allocating power over immigration at the federal (or
supranational) level. As demonstrated in Part II, the choice of
rationales can have significant effects in constructing the ongoing
relationship between the central level and the states in the
immigration policy area, creating a path dependency that may be hard

192. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts:
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1615 (2000) (“[The plenary power]
doctrine, which has effectively insulated federal immigration statutes from constitutional review,
has long fascinated academic commentators.”); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign
Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 703 (2002) (“Pronouncements from the Court in the
field of immigration law are replete with statements that would shock the sensibilities of the
domestic constitutional lawyer.”); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive
Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 987–88 (1998).
193. It is certainly true that current immigration scholars pay less attention to the
subsidiarity or collective action federalism rationale. See generally Lindsay, Immigration as
Invasion, supra note 153 (focusing on the transition from the commerce clause rationale to the
inherent sovereignty rationale, and describing the inherent sovereignty rational as one of
“national security”). But cf. Abrams, supra note 180, at 611–18 (discussing the differences
between what she describes as structural preemption—the federal interest in immigration—and
the plenary power—focused on the political interests in foreign affairs).
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to escape. In Europe, the Commission and the national parliaments
are at a critical juncture: What types of justifications for central action
over immigration will be found persuasive? The nature of the United
States experience is historically contingent and raises some issues,
such as sovereignty of the national federal state, that are unmatched
in the European context. Nevertheless, the role that the foreign affairs
justification has played in the United States can serve as a cautionary
tale to Member States of the European Union. This section outlines
some of the possible lessons for the European Union from the United
States and makes a preliminary assessment of the likelihood of the
emergence of a European “plenary power” over immigration.
* * *
The underlying foreign affairs rationale for federal plenary power
over immigration in the United States in part rested on a theory of
federalism akin to that of subsidiarity. The Supreme Court used the
logic of federalism and the threats of hold-outs and collective action
problems to reinforce the argument that the federal government
should have power over immigration. This parallelism alone should
encourage Member States to assess whether the expansive nature of
the foreign affairs construct might be replicated in the EU. But there
are additional reasons specific to the European Union that reinforce a
linkage between foreign policy and immigration regulation.
The Commission has long advocated a connection between
195
international development policy and migration, and thus, as a
political matter, foreign policy is seen by some as tightly connected to
immigration regulation. As discussed in Part I, in the European
Union, the Commission reflects the “Comprehensive” or “Global
196
Approach” to immigration. This approach categorizes asylum and
immigration policy as a foreign policy issue, rather than as a matter of

194. There are, of course, differences between judicial reasons and legislative reasons. The
flexibility inherent in legislative reasoning, without the constraints of stare decisis, weakens the
path-dependent nature of the Commission’s constructs. There remains power (and potential
threat) in the Commission’s determinations, however, both in terms of structuring the dialogue
on subsidiarity and because the ECJ has stated that when reviewing subsidiarity issues, it will
look to the Commission’s rationales (as provided in its impact statement). See supra note 104
and accompanying text.
195. As early as 1994, the Commission argued that “if migration pressures are not
adequately managed through a careful cooperation with the countries concerned, it is easy to
predict the risk of friction to the detriment of international relations and the immigrant
population itself.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and European
Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, at 6, COM (94) 23 final (Feb. 23, 1994).
196. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
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domestic policy, even a European-wide domestic policy. Scholars have
indicated some confusion about how exactly the Comprehensive
Approach is developing at the EU level. As Joanne van Selm has
asked: “Is asylum and immigration becoming a foreign policy matter?
Or is foreign policy being used for asylum and immigration policy
ends? Or are asylum, immigration, and foreign policies becoming one
197
single entity?” To the extent it is the foreign policy rationale that
gives the Commission power to promote its approach to immigration,
the answer to van Selm’s question is irrelevant. Under any view,
power could accrue to the supranational level.
The politics of international development and its relation to
migration further complicate the first-order question of allocating
power. The danger of subsidiarity analysis is that it can “collapse the
constitutional question (‘What [is permitted]?’) into a policy question
198
(‘What [is desirable]?’).” Those states that wish for integrated
asylum, migration, and development policies may well prefer that
action be taken by the Commission. If the Commission has support
among Member States for its policy position, Member State
parliaments are unlikely to push back based on subsidiarity
199
concerns. Of course, this assumes a unified policy position in a given
Member State, and as scholars have shown, the interests in a
disaggregated state can be in opposition (the interests of a Member
State’s executive power represented in the Council could conflict with
those of that Member State’s parliament reviewing decisions on
200
Nevertheless, the influence that policy
subsidiarity grounds).
201
preferences will have on subsidiarity determinations may be sizable.
197. van Selm, supra note 38, at 143, 145.
198. Young, supra note 173, at 17.
199. See Ritzer et al., supra note 56, at 757–58 (“[I]n parliamentary democracies such as the
German, the government’s parliamentary majority will rarely oppose legal acts of the
Community that have been endorsed by the government, even in terms of subsidiarity.”).
200. See Lavenex, supra note 100, at 331 (“The ‘escape to Europe’ rather results from a
‘new raison d’Etat[,]’ which consists in the strengthening of particular governmental actors and
their preferred policy agenda over other parts of the domestic consistency, including other
sections of the public bureaucracies, but also parliament, political parties[,] or courts.” (citation
omitted)); see also Andreas Ette & Thomas Faist, The Europeanization of National Policies and
Politics of Immigration: Research, Questions and Concepts, in THE EUROPEANIZATION OF
NATIONAL POLICIES AND POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION 3, 8 (Thomas Faist & Andreas Ette eds.,
2007) (identifying “opportunity afforded to national bureaucrats to circumvent political
constraints on the national level by shifting to the new venue the European level offered”).
201. In the United States, immigration politics do not necessarily overlap with the debate
over allocation of power. While some states seek more immigration power in order to institute
restrictive policy—such as Arizona’s SB 1070—certain states promote federalism in order to
enact more permissive legislation, as in Maryland’s recent DREAM Act. Nick Anderson & Luz
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The expansive logic of foreign policy as an appropriate arena for
central-level control and the possibility that Member State
immigration policy preferences might be more easily achieved at the
European level will combine to exert a tremendous pressure for
Union-level competence over an expanding portfolio of immigration
issues. But it is safe to assume that some level of Member State
involvement in immigration-related regulation is both necessary,
given that few federal systems are able to operate immigration
systems without local involvement, and desired, due to the Member
States’ historic reluctance to cede power over immigration to
Brussels. What might serve as a countervailing force?
The drafters of the Early Warning System hoped this mechanism
would serve to protect the interests of the Member States. Thus far,
however, subsidiarity review by the national parliaments has been
tepid. As the Commission reported in 2012, in “none of the 2011 cases
were the thresholds for triggering the yellow or orange cards met . . . .
[T]he vast majority of the 28 legislative proposals on which national
Parliaments issued reasoned opinions in 2011 elicited at most three
202
reasoned opinions.” The attention by national parliaments to
subsidiarity issues had increased by seventy-five percent over that in
2010 (the time of the Seasonal Workers Directive)—but the actual
203
numbers of reasoned opinions remain low. An additional concern
lies in the inattention of the national parliaments to the foreign policy
rationale used by the Commission.
As noted in Part I, the reasoned opinions against the Seasonal
Workers Directive did little to contradict the arguments advanced by
204
the Commission on the grounds of foreign policy. One way of
limiting the power of the rationale would be for the national
parliaments to demand that the Commission provide a specific nexus
between the immigration regulation and a particular foreign policy
205
proposal that it supports. In the case of the proposed Directive, the
Lazo, Md. Voters Approve ‘Dream Act’ Law, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2012), http://articles.
washingtonpost.com/2012-11-06/local/35506258_1_tuition-discount-college-students-neil-cparrott; see also Delaney, supra note 177, at 1824–25 (recognizing the indeterminacy of the
question of which level of government—state or federal—is more likely to enact discriminatory
legislation).
202. Subsidiarity Report 2011, supra note 103, at 4.
203. Id. at 9 (identifying only “[sixty-four] opinions were reasoned opinions within the
meaning of Protocol No 2, notifying a breach of the principle of subsidiarity”).
204. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
205. In the American context, Peter Spiro effectively does just this in his challenge to the
foreign affairs justifications of amici in the Arizona case. See Peter Spiro, Why “One Voice”
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Commission argued that foreign policy considerations require
supranational action, in part because third countries have been
waiting for this type of uniformity in the area of seasonal
206
employment. Presumably, therefore, with the Seasonal Workers
Directive in place, the Commission would be better able to negotiate
migration issues with those non-EU states and could do so more
efficiently than the Member States acting individually. The problem,
which Anna Kocharov has noted, is that the proposed Directive
regulates TCNs in general terms, undifferentiated by nationality. Third
countries are most likely to negotiate in order to seek benefits that
accrue to their own nationals; it is far from clear how the proposed
Directive will advance any of the Commission’s plans for improving
207
relations with (or conditions in) specific third countries.
Furthermore, in its reasoned opinion responding to the proposed
Directive, the Dutch Legislature argued that the Commission’s
proposal offered “no added value for making joint agreements with
208
countries of origin regarding seasonal employment.”
The
implication, though not stated, was that individual Member State
209
action had been taken and was effective in that regard.
The American experience should be viewed as a cautionary tale,
and national parliaments concerned about protecting Member State
power over immigration should pay more attention to the arguments
presented by the Commission. The Commission’s foreign policy
Shouldn’t Trump Arizona’s, OPINO JURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/23/why-one-voiceshouldnt-trump-arizonas-or-why-madeleine-albright-is-wrong-about-sb-1070/ (last visited Mar.
27, 2013) (arguing Arizona’s SB 1070 does not hurt national foreign policy and thus finding little
justification for an assertion of implied federal preemption).
206. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
207. Anna Kocharov, Subsidiarity After Lisbon: Federalism Without a Purpose?, in
DECONSTRUCTING EU FEDERALISM THROUGH COMPETENCES, EUI WORKSHOP
PROCEEDINGS 7, 18–19 (June, 14 2011), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/
2012/10631.pdf.
208. Statement from the Eerste Kamer and the Tweede Kamer [Senate and House of
Representatives], Subsidiarity Test of the Proposal for a Directive Concerning the Conditions for
Access to and Residence in the EU of Subjects of Third Countries, with a View to Seasonal
Employment, Oct. 14, 2010 (Neth.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general
/relations/relations_other/npo/netherlands/2010_en.htm.
209. It is unclear whether individual Member State action has been taken. There is certainly
a willingness on the part of other countries to negotiate such agreements. See, e.g., Ministry of
Economic Development, Arab Republic of Egypt, Prospects of Deeper Integration with the
European Union Through the Movement of Natural Persons (2010), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1239120299171/
5998577-1254498644362/6461208-1300395860273/Egypt_Rep.53733.pdf
(outlining
possible
negotiation positions for the Government in Egypt that would facilitate the creation of
temporary labor migration agreements with individual EU countries).
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justification may serve to encourage further creeping competence in
the immigration realm. But the extreme result of the American
system—the ouster of state action in many spheres of immigrationrelated regulation—is an unlikely end point for the European Union.
For one reason, the Lisbon Treaty provides a textual limit on the
Union institutions’ power, by giving the Member States the authority
to decide on volumes of admissions in Article 79(5). The logic of
subsidiarity and foreign policy cannot override the express provision
of retained power in the Treaty. Even if creeping competence and
central level power expansion shift much of the power, the Member
States will have more flexibility for action than do the states in the
United States.
Finally, to the extent that the national sovereignty aspect of the
justification plays a significant role in driving the American doctrine,
the Commission has few European powers to rely on in parallel and
the Member States retain key national foreign policy powers.
Although the Lisbon Treaty has conferred legal personality onto the
210
Union, allowing it to take action as an entity on the world stage, and
further empowered a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
211
Security Policy, the European Union does not share the inherent
212
sovereign powers in the United States identified by Justice Miller.
213
The EU does not have war powers or the machinery to conduct war,
and European-wide decisions tied to these aspects of sovereignty are
concluded intergovernmentally, by agreement among the Member
States in the Council. Most high-level decisions on major questions of
sovereign power are still taken by each individual Member State,
acting alone.
210. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 50, art. 47, at 41 (“The Union shall have legal
personality.”).
211. The Treaty of Amsterdam first created the High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy (then named the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security
Policy), Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 37, art. J.8, at 13, and the Lisbon Treaty expanded the
reach of the post, TFEU, supra note 14, tit. V, at 28 (“General Provisions on the Union’s
External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy.”).
212. See supra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.
213. Despite its lack of war powers, the EU cooperates closely with NATO in military
actions and crisis management. NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm (last visited Mar. 27,
2013). In addition, the European Union has been working since 1999 to develop a European
Rapid Reaction Force to act as a single EU military body. See Boyka Stefanova, The European
Union as a Security Actor: Security Provision Through Enlargement, 168 WORLD AFF. 51, 59
(2005) (“[I]nstability in the [Balkans] brought about efforts to streamline the security posture of
the union by a capacity to address difficult security issues. In December 1999, the European
Council decided to create an EU Rapid Reaction Force . . . .”).
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CONCLUSION
The European Union is at a critical juncture in the development
of its particular brand of constitutional federalism in the immigration
arena. The Lisbon Treaty made immigration a shared competence
between the Member States and the supranational level, with the
principle of subsidiarity designed to structure the allocation of
specific regulatory power. In justifying its decision to take regulatory
action, the Commission alluded to the implications immigration had
for foreign policy concerns. This rationale for supranational power
echoes that provided by the United States Supreme Court in the late
1890s to support federal power over immigration. The Supreme
Court’s decisions had doctrinal and practical implications for
American federalism, leading to a situation in which states have no
constitutionally protected role in the immigration system. To the
extent Member States in the European Union are concerned about
maintaining their role in immigration, they should be alert to the
types of arguments the Commission is making to justify its power and
should insist on a specific nexus between a proposed regulation and
the Union’s foreign policy interests.
At bottom, the European Union is unlikely to progress entirely in
the American direction—individual Member States retain far more
sovereign power than individual American states do, and perhaps
than they ever did, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s efforts to revive
214
arguments about inherent state sovereignty. But just because the
Union will not slide to the bottom of the American slippery slope
does not mean that national parliaments, and Member States, should
not be wary. Creeping competence has been a longstanding concern—
one explicitly addressed in the Lisbon Treaty—and the immigration
power looks likely to accrue to Brussels. As a matter of policy
preference, perhaps this is a good idea. As a matter of the future of
Europe and the end goal of European union, perhaps this is a good
idea. But for those Member States who think otherwise, the American
experience sounds a warning.

214. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In
light of the predominance of federal immigration restrictions in modern times, it is easy to lose
sight of the States' traditional role in regulating immigration—and to overlook their sovereign
prerogative to do so.”).

